policy-engine
// Deterministic governance layer for OpenClaw tool execution. Enforces tool allowlists, deny patterns, path allowlists, risk tiers, dry-run mode, and escalation tracking via the before_tool_call hook. Every decision is logged for audit. Production-hardened with 88 tests and three deadlock classes fixe
Policy Engine
A deterministic governance layer that hooks into before_tool_call to control which tools agents can use, block dangerous commands, enforce write-path restrictions, and audit every decision.
Installation
clawhub install policy-engine
Then enable in your openclaw.json:
{
"plugins": {
"policy-engine": {
"enabled": true
}
}
}
Quick Start
Minimal restrictive config — limit a sub-agent to read-only tools:
{
"plugins": {
"policy-engine": {
"enabled": true,
"allowlists": {
"readonly": ["read", "web_fetch", "web_search", "message"]
},
"routing": {
"research-agent": { "toolProfile": "readonly" }
}
}
}
}
Features
Tool Allowlists
Per-agent profiles controlling which tools are permitted. Assign profiles via routing rules keyed by agent ID.
Deny Patterns
Built-in patterns block fork bombs, rm -rf, mkfs, disk wipes, and system path writes. Scoped matching checks only relevant params (e.g., command for exec, path for write) — never file content. Add custom patterns per tool.
Path Allowlist Enforcement
Canonicalizes file paths via path.resolve() then checks against allowed directory prefixes. Prevents path traversal attacks (e.g., ../../etc/passwd) even via prompt injection.
{
"pathAllowlists": {
"write": ["/Users/joe/.openclaw/workspace"],
"edit": ["/Users/joe/.openclaw/workspace"]
}
}
With this config, write to /Users/joe/.openclaw/workspace/foo.txt → allowed. write to /Users/joe/.openclaw/workspace/../../etc/hosts → blocked (resolves to /Users/joe/etc/hosts, outside prefix).
Risk Tiers
- T0 — read-only (read, web_fetch, search) — always allowed, even under escalation
- T1 — write (write, edit, message)
- T2 — exec/system (exec, browser, deploy)
Override with riskTiers map:
{ "riskTiers": { "my_custom_tool": "T2" } }
Dry-Run Mode
Test policies without blocking. Essential tools (message, gateway, session_status) always pass through to prevent agent deadlock.
{ "dryRun": true, "dryRunAllowT0": true }
Escalation Tracking
Counts blocked attempts per session. After maxBlockedRetries (default: 3), further non-essential calls are blocked with a remediation message.
Hot-Reload
Config changes via gateway config.patch take effect immediately — no restart needed.
Fail-Open on Error
If the engine itself throws, the tool call proceeds. Safety over availability of governance.
Break-Glass
Set OPENCLAW_POLICY_BYPASS=1 to bypass all checks. Logged as a warning for audit.
Configuration Reference
| Field | Type | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
enabled | boolean | true | Global kill-switch |
dryRun | boolean | false | Log-only mode (no blocking) |
dryRunAllowT0 | boolean | true | Allow T0 tools in dry-run |
dryRunEssentialTools | string[] | [message, gateway, session_status, sessions_send, sessions_list, tts] | Tools that always pass in dry-run |
maxBlockedRetries | number | 3 | Escalation threshold per session |
riskTiers | object | {} | Tool → "T0"|"T1"|"T2" overrides |
denyPatterns | object | {} | Tool → string[] of blocked argument patterns |
allowlists | object | {} | Profile → string[] of allowed tool names |
routing | object | {} | AgentId → { model?, toolProfile? } |
pathAllowlists | object | {} | Tool → string[] of allowed directory prefixes |
Common Patterns
Restrictive Sub-Agent
{
"allowlists": {
"researcher": ["read", "web_fetch", "web_search", "message"],
"coder": ["read", "write", "edit", "exec", "message"]
},
"routing": {
"research-bot": { "toolProfile": "researcher" },
"code-bot": { "toolProfile": "coder" }
}
}
Block Dangerous Commands + Custom Patterns
{
"denyPatterns": {
"exec": ["npm publish", "docker push"],
"write": ["/secrets/", "/credentials/"]
}
}
Dry-Run Testing
Enable dry-run to see what would be blocked before enforcing:
{ "dryRun": true }
Check logs for [policy-engine] DRYRUN entries, then disable when satisfied.
Per-Agent Model Routing
{
"routing": {
"cheap-tasks": { "model": "ollama/qwen2.5:latest" },
"complex-tasks": { "model": "anthropic/claude-opus-4", "toolProfile": "full" }
}
}
Slash Command
The plugin registers a /policy command:
/policy status— show current config and session stats/policy reset— reset escalation counters
Architecture
See DESIGN.md for detailed design decisions, deadlock analysis, and the three deadlock classes that were discovered and fixed during development.